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THE TYRANNY OF FORWARD PRESENCE
Daniel Gouré
Aspecter is haunting U.S. Navy strategic and force planning. It is the specterof forward presence, the continual deployment of Navy and Marine Corps
units in waters adjacent to foreign littorals. Although the Navy speaks of its
central purpose as maritime power projection, it is forward presence, particu-
larly in peacetime, that drives both force structure requirements and operations
tempo. The demands placed on both force structure and operations tempo by
the Navy’s long-standing commitment to maintain forward presence in
multiple regions have been exacerbated in the past few years by that institution’s
desire to extend its area of influence to both littoral waters and the land beyond.
The ever-increasing scope of forward presence exerts a tyrannical hold on the
future of the Navy, a hold that threatens—in an era of constrained defense bud-
gets and rapidly changing threats—to break the force.
The general argument for forward presence as a
cardinal principle of Navy strategic planning is that
“shaping” the international environment is a neces-
sary and appropriate mission for the U.S. military in
general, and the Navy in particular.1 The military is
not alone in believing in the importance of the
“shaping” mission. Under various rubrics, this im-
petus was central to the Clinton administration’s
articulation of national security policy and national
military strategy.2 Were this only the view of one ad-
ministration, it could be readily dismissed as inter-
national social work.3 But a growing chorus of voices
in the academic and analytic communities argues
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that U.S. defense planning should emphasize “shaping” functions. Some are so
bold as to speak of a new role for U.S. forces in terms of “what can only be
termed ‘imperial policing.’ ”4
The myth that the world is in dire need of shaping or policing derives from
the proposition that with the end of the Cold War the forces that had dampened
disorder and disunity ceased to function. This “chaos theory” increasingly per-
vades all the services and the Department of Defense as well, but the Navy and
Marine Corps have been among its chief proponents. Here is but one example of
the Navy–Marine Corps view:
Never again will the United States exist in a bipolar world whose nuclear shadow
suppressed nationalism and ethnic tensions. The international system, in some re-
spects, reverted to the world our ancestors knew. A world of disorder. Somalia,
Bosnia, Liberia, Haiti, Rwanda, Iraq, and the Taiwan Straits are examples of continu-
ing crises we now face. Some might call this period an age of chaos.5
But is this Hobbesian vision real? Has the world reverted in the last decade to
a state of nature, from some prior regime of civility, or at least restraint? The
Middle East suffered four Arab-Israeli wars prior to the end of the Cold War. For
decades, Iraq engaged in predatory behavior toward its neighbors—producing
most notably a ten-year bloodbath with Iran—before deciding to invade Ku-
wait. India and Pakistan have several wars to their account, the last in 1971, as
well as chronic conflict over Kashmir. The Taiwan Straits is a military problem
not because of the end of the Cold War but because of China’s arms buildup and
the failure of the United States to provide countervailing capabilities to Taiwan.
The civil and regional wars of Africa are largely consequences of colonization
and the rivalries of the Cold War itself.
Many once-fractious parts of the world have become more stable over the past
decade. The collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the downfall of the Soviet Union
eliminated the major supporter of international terrorism. Thereafter, the in-
ability of Russia to provide cheap conventional weapons to client states also re-
duced regional arms races dramatically. Lack of arms may have reduced as well
the aggressive tendency of such former client states as Syria, Libya, Iraq, and
Iran. One can point even to recent events on the Korean Peninsula as a direct,
albeit delayed, result of Pyongyang’s loss of its Soviet godfather.
Where problems have arisen, it is not clear that the end of the Cold War was
the catalytic event. It is difficult, for instance, to establish a correlation between
the end of the Cold War and the rise of militant Islam. Further, events in Indone-
sia have had less to do with the rise and fall of superpowers than with the conse-
quences of the Asian economic crisis (during which, it must be noted, the
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Treasury Department did more to maintain stability than all the U.S. forces de-
ployed to the region).
Current military planning has somewhat tempered its earlier “Boschian”
vision of global chaos, asserting now that it is the uncertainty of our time and
the difficulty of predicting the future security environment that necessitates a
strategy of power projection
based on forward presence.6 The
fault, in that view, lies not in the
unstable nature of the external
world but in our inability to
forecast the future accurately. For planning purposes, uncertainty may be as
good as chaos. In some respects it is even better, since—as the services’ planning
documents note—it requires that the military maintain capabilities to address
all threats.
This sense of chaos, or even mere uncertainty, masks what is really happen-
ing: a restructuring of the international environment, the creation of a new in-
ternational system.7 We know from history that such restructuring is long,
complex, and often quite messy. Wherever we look, in each of the critical regions
of the world, the character of the relations among the dominant powers has yet
to be firmly set, much less put on a course toward stable, positive, and
peaceful relations. Western Europe is waiting to see if a closer union, and with it
an incipient common security and defense identity, can be effected. Nato expan-
sion is confronting the question of Russia’s legitimate security interests in
Eastern Europe. China’s role in East Asia is being defined by Beijing—witness
the 1999 military maneuvers and missile launches against Taiwan—in ways that
must make all of its neighbors nervous; how China acts will determine to a large
extent the behavior of others in the region. The relationship between India and
Pakistan is as tense as it has ever been; increasingly, both states see the need to
reach out to other powers of the Middle East and Asia in order to strengthen
their positions in their own rivalry. Finally, the future of the political and secu-
rity relationships in the Persian Gulf is frozen, and it will be as long as Iraq and
Iran remain pariah states and the United States is required to maintain a military
presence in the area.
Historically, the creation of new international orders has been dominated by
major economic and military powers. This current period of evolution appears
to be no different. In prior periods of reorganization, emerging powers have
sought ways to shift regional and even global power balances in their favor, pro-
voking similar behavior by their adversaries. (It is in this light that we need to
look with some concern at current Russian and Chinese efforts to forge a new
strategic alliance.)
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Certain regions will be most important in the development of the new inter-
national order. For future U.S. policy, three regions are of vital importance: Eu-
rope, from the Atlantic to Russia’s borders; the Pacific Rim, from Korea through
Southeast Asia; and South Asia and the Persian Gulf. Those regions have three
things that set them apart from the rest of the world. First, they contain the over-
whelming predominance of global wealth, economic activity, and technological
investments. Second, they are the loci of vital U.S. allies and of economic inter-
ests that must be protected. Third, they each border on one or more of the
emerging potential competitor states.
The United States is the sole global power; it has interests in every region of
the world and vital interests in each of them.8 Thus, while it is difficult to identify
where confrontations will arise, the sheer breadth and scope of U.S. interests
abroad provide more than a few reasons that this nation may find itself at basic
odds with local adversaries. Indeed, at least one major study of U.S. foreign pol-
icy in the next century argues that the foremost U.S. interest in Asia and Europe
is to prevent the domination of those regions by adversarial powers.9 Therefore,
the United States could find itself in confrontations with rising powers as it seeks
to preserve regional balances of power or American access. This would be partic-
ularly likely should, as has been the case in the past, a powerful regional state
threaten U.S. allies. The United States is likely to be the only nation that can
provide sufficient military support to enable these allies to deter or, if necessary,
defeat such an adversary.
It is true that the post–Cold War world has demonstrated a degree of disor-
derliness. But it can hardly be said that the world has entered a period of mount-
ing chaos. Nor can it be claimed that U.S. decision makers and planners are
paralyzed by uncertainty. They continue to make decisions and set priorities on
force structure, regional deployments, and future acquisitions with a great deal
of self-assurance. The chaos/uncertainty argument, then, serves largely as a
means of defending the military against the increasingly evident need to make
hard choices with respect to current missions and future capabilities. For the
Navy, the validity of the doctrine of forward presence represents one of those
hard choices.
SHOULD THE NAVY MAINTAIN A STRATEGY OF
FORWARD PRESENCE?
It is not clear that the U.S. military should focus its planning and force-building
around forward presence, much less “imperial policing.” The idea that military
forces can shape the political environment in regions in which they are deployed
has become fashionable as a result of the rise of an issues-based approach to
national security policy.10 Many of these issues are sociopolitical in nature, and
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their solutions fall, broadly speaking, under the heading of “shaping.” The trend
toward employing military forces for political purposes has been given addi-
tional impetus by the activism of the regional commanders in chief (such as
those of Pacific Command or Central Command), which has grown as the power
of the State Department and U.S. ambassadors to conduct foreign policy has de-
clined.11 (One of the potential consequences of their use of forward-deployed
forces for political purposes was highlighted by the USS Cole incident.)
It is for these reasons, then, that the U.S. military is increasingly focused on
and driven by the demands of peacetime and crisis forward presence. The prob-
lem of maintaining forward presence has been a crucial factor, for instance, in
the U.S. Air Force’s creation of a new organization centered on ten aerospace ex-
peditionary forces. The U.S. Army is undergoing its own transformation, seek-
ing to become more responsive and deployable. Each of the services is investing
in capabilities to make rapid forward presence easier to establish, whether for
major conflicts or smaller contingencies.
In particular, and without question, forward presence has served the Navy
well. Forward presence provides a defensible rationale for force sizing, a matter
of particular importance in the absence of a threat.12 In any case, the Navy func-
tions best when it is under way, and as long as it is steaming, it might as well do so
where it might be needed.
The idea of forward presence, however, is for the Navy more than a bureaucratic
convenience; it is an article of faith. According to the Navy’s own Strategic Planning
Guidance, “By remaining forward, combat-credible naval expeditionary forces
guarantee that the landward reach of U.S. influence is present to favorably shape
the international environment.” In the Navy’s view, forward-deployed naval
forces discourage challenges to U.S. interests, deter would-be aggressors, and,
should deterrence fail, provide means for a timely response. For these reasons,
the Navy argues, it could play a new and unique role in U.S. national security.
But for this to be true, forward presence has to be the Navy’s central mission.13
For a number of reasons, tying the future of the Navy to forward presence is
problematic. The concept of “shaping” the international environment is fuzzy at
best. Too often it has extended well beyond traditional notions of security to in-
volve, inter alia, attempts to influence the internal politics of failing states, ef-
forts to address almost intractable socioeconomic problems, and engagement in
what are classic policing functions. Looked at this way, Navy combat forces seem
to have little relevance.14 The forces that would seem to be most useful in the
social-work and policing dimensions of forward presence are those generally
classed as “combat support” or “combat service support” (e.g., engineer, mili-
tary police, logistical, and medical units).
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The term “forward presence” too is subject to interpretation and competing
definitions. In its narrow sense, the emphasis is on forward—it simply means the
deployment of forces in proximity to locations of interest to U.S. security and
foreign policy. A broader definition, focusing on the word presence, suggests
more complex and political purposes, for which presence generally needs to be
nearly continuous and highly visible—requirements that can limit both the flex-
ibility and the combat effectiveness of the forces engaged.
Leaving aside for the moment the question of what constitutes a combat-credible
force, it is fair to ask what evidence there is that naval forward presence helps to
shape the international environment. One can acknowledge that military forces
can perform tasks that are essentially political in nature, such as demonstrating
resolve and commitment. The objective of these tasks is different from that of
forward presence, as narrowly defined above.
Advocates of forward presence as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy must
acknowledge that there is no empirical evidence to support their case. This is
particularly true for naval forward presence. While various theories have been
propounded as to the relationship
between the pursuit of national
objectives, the protection of re-
gional interests, the suppression
of sources of regional instability,
and forward presence, none has
any real data to support it.15 It has
been possible to show in certain instances some relationship between the ebb
and flow of economic indicators and the deployment of U.S. forces; however,
these cases involve the deployment of forces after crises or conflicts have started.16
Such analyses have not been able to demonstrate the usefulness of peacetime
forward presence as a mechanism for preventing conflicts and shaping regional
environments. As one analyst (in fact, an advocate of naval power) noted a few
years ago, “The interesting fact is that there is virtually little or no evidence, anal-
ysis and rigorous examination on which to make a fair and objective assessment
of the benefits, costs, advantages and downsides of presence. . . . [T]he record is
at best ambiguous regarding the utility, benefits and disadvantages of naval
presence.”17
Even the projection of maritime power may not serve to shape the environ-
ment or resolve a regional crisis. The history of the U.S. presence in the Persian
Gulf in the 1980s—including Operation EARNEST WILL, the ill-fated attempt
to protect oil shipments by reflagging foreign-registry tankers—does not sup-
port the thesis that naval forward presence exercises a positive influence on re-
gional dynamics. Similarly, it is considered self-evident in Navy circles that the
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deployment of two aircraft carriers to the Taiwan Straits region ended the 1996
crisis. At least one post-incident assessment suggests otherwise.18
In addition to the shaping function, the Navy asserts, forward presence
provides unique operational advantages. The Navy makes a strong case that
such deployments are critical enablers of joint warfare, through a combination
of sea control and maritime power projection; for instance, where land bases are
not available, naval forces can become alternative bases. Naval power-projection
capabilities, in this view, are likely to be less vulnerable to adversary attack than
land bases. Even here, however, the other services have attempted to make cases
that forward presence can be accomplished in other ways and with different
means.19
The land-versus-sea-base argument has been going on for a long time, with
no resolution in sight. It is sufficient here to point out that the fact that naval for-
ward presence may be needed if land bases are not available does not make it the
preferred solution. Indeed, when the stakes are sufficiently grave or vital inter-
ests and allies are threatened, it is unlikely that U.S. political and military leaders
will rely solely on naval forward presence. To put it bluntly, if land bases are nec-
essary, they will be found or even seized. This is an often-overlooked lesson of
the Gulf War and the Kosovo campaign. In this connection, the Navy itself
speaks of its role as that of an enabler, suggesting that it is the responsibility of
the other services—those that require land basing—to win a war. In that light, it
is not clear that allies will find the simple presence of naval units offshore
adequate. U.S. “boots on the ground” have reassured allies for some fifty
years as indications that the United States is willing to share equally in the risks
of resisting aggression.
At the very minimum, the Navy needs to rethink how it describes the forward-
presence mission.20 Justifying forward presence in terms of the ability to shape
the international environment raises questions of how relevant the current Navy
force structure is to that purpose. Moreover, it risks promising more than the
Navy can deliver, at least in terms of demonstrable impact. Also, because for-
ward presence is tied to a particular national security strategy, it may be ren-
dered less relevant if the new administration formulates a new, more restrained
strategy.
It is, then, difficult to see continuous, peacetime forward presence as anything
other than a vehicle for defending the Navy’s desired force structure. The political
rationale is weak at best, and holding on to it may undermine the Navy’s case for
more capable forces in the future. One naval officer appears to have recognized
the danger in a recent article: “If . . . naval forward presence forces have but small
roles in crisis response and contingencies, such forces are luxuries that may have
G O U R É 1 7
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some relevance in peacetime diplomacy but little usefulness in crisis and war.
This is not an impression that bodes well for the future of a military service.”21
CAN THE NAVY MAINTAIN A STRATEGY OF
FORWARD PRESENCE?
Even if it were obvious that forward presence is an important tool of U.S. na-
tional security strategy, there are reasons to believe that it will not be possible to
continue it for long. Forward presence places inordinate and, in the current bud-
getary environment, unsustainable physical demands on the Navy. Some fixed
and substantial number of ships is necessary to maintain a fraction of them on
station continually. For every ship deployed, the U.S. Navy requires between
three and five more in rotation: steaming to or from the deployment area; in
overhaul; in port for leave and repair; and “working up” in local training exer-
cises. All that in turn translates into a minimum required budget. It is clear that
the Navy will not have a large enough budget, and thus not enough ships. Vice
Admiral Edmund Giambastiani was reported to have pegged the Navy–Marine
Corps annual procurement budget at between twenty-eight and thirty-four
billion dollars annually, far above the twenty-two-billion average for the past
decade.22 The lower procurement number translates into reduced ship construc-
tion and, inevitably, a navy of fewer than three hundred ships. Even if additional
funds and an adequate number of ships were available, changes to the threat en-
vironments in regions where forward naval presence is now practiced raise ques-
tions as to its wisdom.
All naval forces are subject to the terrible tyranny of distance. It takes time for
ships to sail from their home ports to deployment areas. Nowhere are the dis-
tances to be traveled greater than in the Pacific. Whereas it typically takes a U.S.
warship about eleven days to travel from the East Coast to its assigned station in
the Mediterranean, the same deployment can take up to twenty days from the
West Coast of the United States to the littoral waters of the Asian landmass.
No other navy is so tyrannized by its strategy and geography as that of the
United States. Every other naval power is concerned largely with the protection
of its own coastlines and nearby waters. Only the United States is confronted
with the need to project naval power eight to ten thousand miles to areas of
concern. The farther away a deployment area is from home ports, the more ships
are required in order that a given number can be continually present. Hence a
strategy that emphasizes forward presence inevitably puts additional strain on
an already-overstretched U.S. Navy.
From a force of nearly six hundred ships in the late 1980s, the Navy has been
reduced to a little over three hundred ships today, of which approximately 45
percent must be under way in order to meet current peacetime responsibilities.
1 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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This places enormous strain not only on the ships but on the men and women
who serve aboard them. At the same time, because of reduced funds for ship-
building, the average age of the Navy’s vessels is increasing; accordingly, break-
downs become more frequent,
maintenance costs rise, and avail-
ability rates decline. However
valuable forward presence may
be in the Pentagon’s internecine
budget battles, it can impose in-
tolerable stress on a service that is asked to perform missions for which it is
underequipped. When forward presence becomes a burden to the very service
that is its chief proponent, it is time to rethink the whole proposition.
The Navy understands the problem. In testimony before the House of Repre-
sentatives in 2000, Vice Admiral Conrad Lautenbacher, Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations, declared that “it is no secret that our current resources of 316 ships
are fully deployed and in many cases stretched thin to meet the growing national
security demands.”23 This is not merely the view from headquarters. Admiral
Dennis McGinn, commander of the Third Fleet, stated before Congress in Feb-
ruary 2000 that “force structure throughout the Navy is such that an increased
commitment anywhere necessitates reduction of operations somewhere else, or
a quality of life impact due to increased operating tempo.”24 The commander of
the U.S. Fifth Fleet, operating in the Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf, said it best:
Although I am receiving the necessary forces to meet Fifth Fleet obligations, the fleet
is stretched and I am uncertain how much longer the Navy can continue to juggle
forces to meet the varied regional requirements, including Fifth Fleet’s. I am uncer-
tain that we have the surge capability to meet a major theater contingency, or theater
war. Eventually, the increased operational tempo on our fewer and fewer ships will
take its toll on their availability and readiness.25
The reality is that numbers matter. The U.S. Navy is critically short of ships;
it does not have enough to maintain a full-time, combat-credible naval presence
in regions of interest to the U.S. and provide the necessary surge capability for
crisis or war. As a result of recent events like Kosovo, for which the western Pa-
cific was stripped of its aircraft carrier, public and congressional attention has
been focused on the inadequacy of the Navy’s inventory of carriers. Further, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff have published a study concluding that the nation requires
sixty-eight attack submarines instead of the fifty that have been allowed. A
recent surface combatant study concludes that the Navy requires up to 139
multimission warships in order to satisfy the full range of requirements and
carry out day-to-day operations; instead, the Navy has been allowed only 116.
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At least a quarter of its surface combatants are aging frigates and older destroyers
that lack offensive and defensive capabilities essential to a twenty-first-century
navy. Speaking of the lack of surface combatants, one senior naval officer has
been quoted as saying, “We know we are broken. We are running our ships into
the ground, our missions are expanding and our force structure is being driven
down to 116 surface ships. We have to address it before we hit the precipice.”26
Unfortunately, without significantly higher defense budgets, there is no pos-
sibility that the Navy will be able to acquire the ships and submarines it needs to
maintain its current forward presence posture. It is already evident that U.S.
defense spending is well short of what will be required to maintain the existing
force structure. The United States
must be willing to spend on aver-
age 4 percent of its gross domestic
product (GDP) to support fully
the force recommended by the
Quadrennial Defense Review over the next twenty years, fiscal years (FY) 2001–20.
In fact, however, based on the current FY 2002 budget submission to Congress,
defense spending will fall from 2.9 percent of GDP in FY 2000 to 2.4 percent in
FY 2010, and to 2 percent in 2020.27
The Congressional Budget Office reports that the Defense Department is
faced with annual budget shortfalls of fifty-two to seventy-seven billion dollars.
General Henry Shelton, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified before
Congress in October 2000 that the military services had estimated that they will
need at least $48.5 billion more each year. The Secretary of the Air Force, F. Whitten
Peters, asserted in a recent interview that the U.S. military needed some $100
billion over current spending levels in order to replace aging equipment and
maintain or improve operational readiness.28 Unless real annual defense spending
is increased well above the current $310 billion at some time during this decade,
the president and Congress will be left with little choice but to make additional
personnel cuts, force structure reductions, and base closures.
The Navy will suffer severely if such projections, and others, of budgetary
shortfalls are even approximately accurate. A recent Navy study warned that
procurement was short some eight-five billion dollars for the period 2008–20,
with the shipbuilding budget likely to be underfunded by some four billion
annually, and naval aviation by $3.3 billion.29 These shortfalls could result in a
Navy one-third to one-half its present size by the year 2010.
If the force cannot be recapitalized, perhaps it can be modernized or trans-
formed, thereby avoiding the problem of finding the necessary additional funds.
A number of analytic and political writers have advocated “skipping genera-
tions” in procurement in order to focus attention and resources on revolutionary
2 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
Were “shaping” only the view of one adminis-
tration, it could be readily dismissed as inter-
national social work.
10
Naval War College Review, Vol. 54 [2001], No. 3, Art. 2
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol54/iss3/2
capabilities. Unhappily, the idea of skipping a generation is a fantasy. There is an
illusion among its advocates that the current force will last the additional
twenty-odd years while the transformation takes place. In fact, however, the
funds necessary to support a transformation can be freed up only if current
forces and near-term acquisitions are sharply reduced. Reducing forces and ac-
quisitions now will only make the conduct of current operations, including for-
ward presence, more difficult. Moreover, reducing the acquisitions will seriously
damage the defense industrial base, on which the services will have to rely for the
production of next-generation equipment.
Budgetary strictures also constrain the fielding of the advanced capabilities
forward-deployed forces will need if they are to be combat credible and surviv-
able. The Navy acknowledges that the threat to its forward-deployed forces is
serious and likely to grow substantially worse over the next few decades.30 This
means that combatants built for the Cold War are increasingly vulnerable,
particularly in littoral waters. The Navy will need to invest in a host of new
technologies enhancing both the offensive and defensive power of the fleet;
otherwise, forward presence will be not merely an expensive conceit but a truly
dangerous fetish. Yet it is not clear that either the technology or the resources
will be available. The demand that the Navy operate forward in peacetime, then,
exerts a perverse effect, forcing on the Navy an expensive modernization/trans-
formation effort that may in the end prove unsuccessful, if only due to a lack of funds.
It must also be recognized that even if transformation is possible, it will
take decades to complete. As a result, today’s Navy will be required to execute the
forward-presence strategy ten and even twenty years into the future. If, as is
argued by advocates of transformation, today’s Navy will be the wrong force
with which to maintain forward presence or contest littoral waters, it seems ob-
vious that the problem is not with the force but with the demand that the Navy
continue to base its strategy on forward presence. The Navy must seek ways
other than slavish obedience to the tyranny of forward presence to pursue its
strategic objectives and support national security.
There remains a final question. Facing a growing littoral threat, depending on
large “Cold War era” ships and submarines, and recognizing the effort by some
potential adversaries to acquire “green” and even “blue-water” capabilities, why
does the Navy continue to emphasize forward presence? It would seem reckless,
to say the least, to continue to pursue a demanding strategy with declining re-
sources of the wrong type. Moreover, it would seem to be a waste of the single
advantage that the U.S. Navy possesses and that will remain uncontested for de-
cades to come: its ability to dominate the open oceans.
Operating in close-in waters would appear to provide littoral adversaries
with an unacceptable advantage. The desire of potential adversaries to contest
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the U.S. Navy for control of these waters suggests that it would be foolhardy for
the Navy to sail into that trap.
THE FUTURE OF FORWARD PRESENCE
The future of forward presence, then, appears uncertain at best. The American
people’s patience with the idea that the United States can shape an international
environment to suit its sensibilities appears to be wearing thin. A more judicious
approach to the application of military power in the service of foreign policy
will inevitably lead to a reduced requirement for forward presence. Where
peacetime forward presence is required, naval forces may not be able to provide
it more effectively than other kinds of forces. It is possible that policy makers
and the public alike will look for more “bang for their presence buck.”
The Navy acknowledges that if forward-deployed forces are to play useful
roles in peacetime or crisis, they must possess credible combat power. It is not
clear how this can be accomplished in the face of the emerging threat. The prolif-
eration of asymmetric and anti-access capabilities may threaten the survivabil-
ity of forward-deployed naval forces. This problem is particularly acute for
traditional surface platforms. Efforts to address the emerging vulnerability of
forward-deployed naval forces by changing the character of naval systems and
developing new concepts of operations may compromise the combat capability
of such forces. To the extent that enhanced survivability must be acquired at the
expense of offensive capabilities, it would seem to undercut the basic rationale
for forward presence.
Finally, if forward-deployed capabilities can be maintained only at the expense
of the ability to control the broad oceans, it will have proven to be a bad decision.
At present there are no threats to the U.S. Navy in the open oceans, and this will
be the case for the next several decades. However, a force built over the next
ten or twenty years for forward presence and littoral combat will have to meet
whatever threats emerge in the “shallow seas” for many decades beyond. In-
creased competition between the United States and rising regional powers could
result in a challenge to the U.S. Navy’s mastery of the open oceans, or at least one
ocean. Such a challenge could come soon enough to necessitate reconsideration
of the present policy of optimizing naval forces for the forward-presence mission.
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